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From Universals to Topics:
The Realism of Rudolph Agricola,




Rudolph Agricola’s De inventione dialectica has rightly been regarded as the most orig-
inal and inﬂuential textbook on argumentation, reading, writing, and communication 
in the Renaissance. At the heart of his treatment are the topics (loci), such as deﬁni-
tion, genus, species, place, whole, parts, similars, and so on. While their function in 
Agricola’s system is argumentative and rhetorical, the roots of the topics are meta-
physical, as Agricola himself explicitly acknowledges. It has led scholars to characterize 
Agricola as a realist or even an extreme realist. This article studies two little treatises on 
universals by Agricola that throw further light on his realism. It is suggested that they 
could be viewed as an early step in his long-term project of revising and re-organizing 
the systems of topics as he encountered them in Aristotle, Cicero, and Boethius. The 
article oﬀers a close analysis of the treatises, suggesting that Agricola’s realism owes a 
(general) debt to the school of the Scotists. In both earlier and later work Agricola 
emphasizes the common aspects of things that enable us to categorize and talk about 
things without denying their fundamental unicity and individuality. An edition of 
Agricola’s second treatise on universals—a reply to a critic—is added.
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1. Agricola: De inventione dialectica and the treatise on universals
One of the most inﬂuential works in the history of Renaissance thinking on 
language and argumentation is Rudolph Agricola’s De inventione dialectica, 
ﬁnished in 1479 but published in 1515 long after Agricola’s death in 1485. In 
this work Agricola, as has been frequently and well explained by scholars, tries 
to bring together rhetoric and dialectic into one system of topical invention, 
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showing how we can ﬁnd arguments by using a set of places or topics (loci) 
such as deﬁnition, genus, species, place, time, similars, opposites, and so forth. 
In Agricola’s hands logic thus becomes a much more practical tool than it was 
before, a tool that aids a student not only in organizing any type of discourse 
but also in analyzing a text in terms of its underlying questions and argumen-
tative structure. The De inventione dialectica contains much more than an 
innovative treatment of the topics, however; it explores a whole range of issues 
concerning what we would now call communication and information. It exer-
cised considerable inﬂuence on major humanists such as Vives, Erasmus, 
Latomus, Melanchthon, Ramus, and Nizolio, and its account of the topics 
was required reading for almost any sixteenth-century author of dialectic 
books. Scholars have even spoken of “a revolutionary impact” as it inaugu-
rated a new tradition of textbooks in rhetoric and dialectic.1
Agricola locates his work ﬁrmly in the tradition of the arts of rhetoric and 
dialectics, and his principal sources are Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and 
Boethius. His aims are instructional and practical rather than metaphysical. 
As Peter Mack has pointed out: “De inventione dialectica does not address the 
problems in metaphysics raised by the earlier books of Aristotle’s Organon. 
Agricola assumes that Aristotle’s metaphysical system is workable, and he 
elaborates it a little (in a strongly realist direction) in order to explain how the 
topics work.”2 Likewise Walter J. Ong said: “Agricola fails to commit himself 
outright to any signiﬁcant theoretical stands, either literary or philosophical.”3 
And indeed in the De inventione dialectica we do not ﬁnd direct discussions of 
the Aristotelian categories, the predicables, or universals, nor is Agricola inter-
ested in philosophical theories about meaning and signiﬁcation. But even if 
the De inventione dialectica does not address metaphysical issues in any explicit 
way, it is not diﬃcult to realize that Agricola’s account of the topics and of 
1) The most extensive discussion of De inventione dialectica and its diﬀusion and inﬂuence is 
Peter Mack, Renaissance Argument. Valla and Agricola in the Traditions of Rhetoric and Dialectic 
(Leiden, 1993). For a concise treatment see also his A History of Renaissance Rhetoric 1380-1620 
(Oxford, 2011), 56-75. See also M. Cogan, ‘Rodolphus Agricola and the Semantic Revolutions 
of the History of Invention’, Rhetorica 2 (1984), 163-194 on the topical systems of Cicero, 
Boethius and Agricola, and their diﬀerences (“revolutionary impact,” 165). Older accounts 
include W. J. Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue. From the Art of Discourse to the 
Art of Reason (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), 92-130 (but outdated in some respects) and C. Vasoli, 
La dialettica e la retorica dell’Umanesimo (Milan, 1968), 147-182.
2) Mack, Renaissance Argument, 255.
3) Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, 100; cf. 98: “Agricola’s dialectic makes no 
issue of being anti-Aristotelian as Ramus’ was to do.”
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language and argumentation in general is based on philosophical assumptions 
that concern the relationship between the world, language, and thought. Can 
the system of the topics, for instance, be considered as a description of reality, 
that is, as the way in which reality is structured, or are the topics merely an aid 
of human invention to point to, describe, talk and argue about things? Do the 
topics perhaps guide our view of reality or perhaps the way we carve up reality? 
More generally, do our terminological distinctions reﬂect ontological distinc-
tions? Agricola does not pose such questions, but some of his statements pre-
suppose a certain view of reality that Mack has characterized as “realist” or 
even “extreme realist in metaphysics,”4 pointing also to a little treatise on uni-
versals, written by Agricola at an earlier stage of his life, that seems to conﬁrm 
this interpretation. This treatise, entitled Singulares aliquot de universalibus 
(“some questions about universals”), was incorporated in the edition of the De 
inventione dialectica by its sixteenth-century editor and commentator, Alardus 
of Amsterdam, who also tells us that Agricola had once planned to write a 
book on universals.5 Because the De inventione dialectica has clearly practical 
and didactic aims and does not address such metaphysical issues, this little 
treatise may tell us in a more direct way something about Agricola’s philo-
sophical position and possibly about the metaphysical assumptions underly-
ing his great work.
Indeed, Eckhard Kessler thinks that this treatise must be regarded as the 
foundation or basis (“Grundlage”) of the De inventione dialectica. In a brief 
discussion he suggests that the treatise is not incompatible with nominalism, 
claiming for instance that Agricola’s deﬁnition of the universal “is analogous to 
Ockham’s deﬁnition of the universal sign.”6 Markus Friedrich has also explored 
the possible presence of nominalist strands in Agricola’s treatise on universals, 
and even though he concludes that Agricola cannot be called an Ockhamist, he 
still leaves open the possibility of some aﬃnities at a general level.7 According 
4) Mack, Renaissance Argument, 136 n. 20; cf. p. 255. As we shall see, Agricola cannot be called 
“an extreme realist.”
5) Agricola, De inventione dialectica, with Alardus’s commentary (Cologne, 1539), 36. The ques-
tions about universals are on pp. 37-41 of this edition. The format does not follow a typically 
scholastic quaestio.
6) E. Kessler, ‘Die verborgene Gegenwart Ockhams in der Sprachphilosophie der Renaissance’, in 
Die Gegenwart Ockhams, eds. W. Vossenkuhl and R. Schönberger (Weinheim, 1990), 147-164, 
on 151: “in Analogie zu Ockhams Deﬁnition des universalen Zeichens.”
7) M. Friedrich, ‘ “War Rudolf Agricola Nominalist?” Zur Bedeutung der Philosophie Ockhams 
für den Sprachhumanismus’, in Res et Verba in der Renaissance, eds. E. Kessler and I. Maclean 
(Wiesbaden, 2002), 369-388.
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to Henk Braakhuis, however, Agricola’s treatise can be interpreted only as 
“clearly realistic,” but the “clartés” of this interpretation are, in the words of 
another scholar, “un peu trop aveuglantes.”8 A closer examination of this trea-
tise is therefore expedient for at least the following reasons. First, scholarly 
disagreement shows that Agricola’s realism is not something completely 
straightforward and unambiguous. Was Agricola indeed a realist, and if so 
what kind of realist? Second, there is another text by Agricola on universals, 
written as a response to a certain Phaselus, who had criticized Agricola’s trea-
tise on universals.9 This response has never been studied or edited, and 
though—as we will see—Agricola basically repeats his original position, it is 
useful to take this response into account as well. I will therefore provide an 
edition of this text in the appendix to this article. Third, a closer examination 
of the treatise—in combination with Agricola’s response to Phaselus—may 
help us determine the nature of Agricola’s metaphysical position in the De 
inventione dialectica. What exactly is the relationship between this early debate 
on universals and Agricola’s mature work on the topics and argumentation? Is 
it indeed “the basis” (Grundlage) of the De inventione dialectica, or is the link 
much more tenuous than that? Can we see echoes of his treatment of univer-
sals in his later discussion of the topics, diﬀerent though they are?
Another but much broader question would be that of Agricola’s place in the 
development of Renaissance humanism, characterized (among other things) 
by the tendency to move away from theory and speculation toward a more 
practical, pragmatic approach in learning and teaching. In some humanists—
we can think of Lorenzo Valla, Pierre Ramus and Mario Nizolio—this took the 
form of a strongly anti-scholastic and anti-Aristotelian attitude, in others—here 
we may mention J. L. Vives and Philipp Melanchthon—it took the form of a 
more moderate criticism of scholastic learning. The ﬁrst group was overtly 
8) H. A. G. Braakhuis, ‘Agricola’s View on Universals’, in Rodolphus Agricola Phrisius, 1444-
1485, ed. F. Akkerman and A. J. Vanderjagt (Leiden, 1988), 239-247; Pierre Lardet’s review of 
this volume in Rhetorica 8 (1990), 280. Also, Kees Meerhoﬀ, ‘Ramus en tijdgenoten’, Lampas 
34 (2001), 352, does not seem very sure whether Agricola can be called a realist. But Agricola’s 
contemporary Wessel Gansfort thought him to be a realist; see H. A. G. Braakhuis, ‘Wessel 
Gansfort between Albertism and Nominalism’, in Wessel Gansfort (1419-1489) and Northern 
Humanism, ed. F. Akkerman et al. (Leiden, 1993), 35. 
9) It was noticed by Mack; see Braakhuis ‘Agricola’s View on Universals’, 240 n. 4, and the 
appendix to Rodolphus Agricola Phrisius, 318 nos. 2 and 3. It is also mentioned by J. Worstbrock 
in his review of Agricola’s Letters, ed. A. van der Laan and F. Akkerman, in Zeitschrift für deutsche 
Philologie 125 (2006), 475, and Worstbrock thinks it should have been incorporated in this 
edition of the letters.
194 L. Nauta / Vivarium 50 (2012) 190-224
anti-metaphysical (which is not to say that their own critique or their own 
alternative views did not derive from metaphysical assumptions), rejecting 
most of the conceptual armory of the scholastics. Valla aimed at reducing the 
categories to three (substance, quality, action), the six transcendentals to just 
one (res, thing), and criticized the traditional account of the predicables and 
important concepts such as form/matter, ﬁnal causes, and privation. Follow-
ing Valla, Nizolio likewise defended a horizontal ontology in which concrete 
things, grouped in classes by a creative act of the human mind, take center 
stage. Rejecting any kind of reiﬁcation or hypostatization, he tried to do away 
with universals and essences. Nizolio explicitly aligned himself with the nom-
inalists (nominales), and Valla too—though this is controversial—has often 
been regarded as a nominalist of some sort, although the only time he men-
tions Ockham he dismisses him as a representative of the perﬁdious lot that 
the scholastic logicians are for him. Now Agricola is often mentioned in one 
breath with Valla; he was certainly an important source for Nizolio and for 
less radical critics of scholastic thought such as Vives and Melanchthon.10 Yet 
he was much less anti-Aristotelian and, arguably, less anti-metaphysical than 
Valla and Nizolio. Not only did he examine the question of universals in a 
separate treatise, using (as we will see) some scholastic terminology that Valla 
and Nizolio would have abhorred, he also praised Aristotle frequently (though 
found his style obscure and diﬃcult to follow) and held Duns Scotus in high 
esteem.11 So what is his position in the humanist critique of essences and uni-
versals such as we ﬁnd in Valla and Nizolio? A full answer to this question is 
beyond the limits that I have imposed on myself in this article, but I will 
brieﬂy take up this question in the conclusion. 
10) On Valla see Mack, Renaissance Argument, 22-116 and L. Nauta, In Defense of Common 
Sense. Lorenzo Valla’s Humanist Critique of Scholastic Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass., 2009). 
On Agricola as a source for Vives, Melanchthon and Ramus see Mack, Renaissance Argument, 
303-355, and 244-250 (comparison between Agricola and Valla), K. Meerhoﬀ, ‘Mélanchthon, 
lecteur d’Agricola: rhétorique et analyse textuelle’, Réforme—Humanisme—Renaissance no. 30, 
16 (1990), 5-22, and idem, ‘Agricola et Ramus: dialectique et rhétorique’, in Rodolphus Agri-
cola Phrisius, 270-280. On Nizolio see L. Nauta, ‘Anti-Essentialism and the Rhetoricization of 
Knowledge: Mario Nizolio’s Humanist Attack on Universals’, Renaissance Quarterly 65 (2012), 
31-66.
11) Duns Scotus is mentioned twice in the De inventione dialectica, ed. Alardus, 155 (Scotus 
omnium, qui philosophiam tractaverunt, disputator multorum consensu acerrimus) and 306. In this 
article all references to the treatise on universals as well as to the De inventione dialectica are to 
Alardus’s edition. I will use the abbreviations De univ. and DID, but it should be borne in mind 
that the former is only a small addition to the latter.
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2. Agricola’s ﬁrst treatise on universals
As mentioned, the treatise on universals, entitled Singulares aliquot de univer-
salibus quaestiones, was not published during Agricola’s lifetime, but was 
incorporated in the text of the De inventione dialectica by its sixteenth-century 
editor, Alardus of Amsterdam. No manuscript copy has survived. Unlike 
Agricola’s response to Phaselus, this treatise does not feature in the famous 
collection of Agricola’s works and letters, compiled posthumously by his 
friend Johannes of Plieningen and written in the hand of Johannes Pfeuzer in 
the 1490s. Alardus probably saw the manuscript in the collection of Pompeius 
Occo, the nephew of Agricola’s friend Adolph Occo, to whom Agricola had 
sent the ﬁrst fair copy of the De inventione dialectica and to whom he had left 
his papers.12 It was only a rough draft and highly corrupt, Alardus writes, and 
he had to emend and edit it with the aid of J. L. Vives and other friends, 
before he could print it as a kind of appendix to chapter 6 of the De inventione 
dialectica on genus and species.13 Neither Alardus nor Agricola himself give us 
any clue when and where Agricola had composed these quaestiones, but it is 
likely—given the subject and the style—that it dates back to his student days 
in Erfurt or Louvain, where Agricola had studied arts and law in an environ-
ment that was still dominated by scholastic thought, although early human-
ism (Frühhumanismus) began to play an increasingly prominent role here too.14 
From his biographers we know that Agricola was interested in classical dialec-
tics already as a student.
12) It might be one of the minor works that Alardus had obtained through Haio Hermann, “who 
had married Pompeius Occo’s daughter” (Mack, Renaissance Argument, 262).
13) De univ., 36: “Proinde non ab re fuerit hic referre censuram Rodolphi Agricolae de uniuer-
salibus, licet non in hoc conscriptam, ut ederetur [aederetur ed.) unquam. Vt enim qui parant 
statuam facere, prius rude quoddam simulacrum ﬁngunt e trunco, postea dolant ac poliunt, ita 
cum Rodolphus Agricola librum aliquem de uniuersalibus instituisset conscribere, hanc futuri 
operis syluulam deliniauit (. . .). Iam uero quum Ioannes Vives Valentinus et Iacobus Volcar-
dus Bergensis praeter philosophiae professionem undecunque doctissimi, non minimo nobis 
adiumento fuerint, ut hanc censuram plane deprauatam, imo mutilam utcunque restitueremus, 
illisque uiris acerrimi sane iudicii non indigna uisa sit, quae in apertum proferretur et huic loco 
inferciretur.”
14) Ibid.: “quamuis extempore, quamuis alieno stomacho scriptum.” Does Alardus suggest that 
it was perhaps too metaphysical for Agricola’s own taste? On Frühhumanismus in Erfurt see G. 
Bauch, Die Universität Erfurt im Zeitalter des Frühhumanismus (Breslau, 1904), mentioning 
Agricola on 40-41; G.-R. Tewes, Die Bursen der Kölner Artisten-Fakultät bis zur Mitte des 16. 
Jahrhunderts (Cologne, 1993), esp. 665-805 on “Bursen-Humanismus und Bursen-Scholastik in 
Köln;” for Louvain hardly any good studies exist on teaching in the ﬁrst part of the sixteenth 
century; see E. Lamberts and J. Roegiers, Leuven University 1425-1985 (Leuven, 1990), 69.
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The treatise starts with “two questions that are frequently posed.”15 “(1) 
whether universals are something existing outside the soul, that is, outside the 
thinking and ﬁgmentum of our mind. And then, if this is the case, (2) whether 
they are to be distinguished from singulars.” The ﬁrst question is answered in 
the aﬃrmative some paragraphs later, but Agricola does not work toward his 
answer in a very orderly way. The second question is answered in the aﬃrma-
tive only in the last paragraph of the treatise. Agricola does not mention any 
source, though it is diﬃcult not to think of the three famous questions with 
which Porphyry started his Isagoge:16 (1) Do universals exist in themselves or 
in mere concepts alone? (2) If they do exist, are they corporeal or incorporeal? 
(3) If incorporeal, do they exist apart or in sensible objects and in connection 
with them?17 Though Agricola does not mention the rival schools of reales and 
nominales—he alludes only to the school of the Scotists much later—the way 
in which he formulates his questions suggests that for him these are the two 
main positions. 
From his own deﬁnition of the universal, which he gives at the beginning, 
Agricola seems to favor a clearly realist position: “a universal is what exists as 
an essential unity and is common to many things; e.g., animal is one genus, 
what is in a horse, an ass, a cow and a man.” (37) The formulation bespeaks a 
realist stance: universals are in things; he does not say, as he does later in the 
De inventione dialectica: “are predicated of many;” we shall come back to this 
point. The crucial problem of course is how something can be one and yet 
exist in many things. Agricola therefore distinguishes between diﬀerent mean-
ings of “one.” We can speak of a unity of collection (a pile of stones), a unity 
of conjunction (body and soul), a unity by denial (“not many,” as in “every 
being has one proper passio,” or “everything that is, is one”), or a unity by like-
ness, community or nature (assimulatione uel communitate uel ratione): white 
things having the “same, one color in common.” This last sense is of course 
what is at stake here: things are like each other or similar (similia) to each 
other if they have the same form or nature or species; or, as Agricola puts it, 
“if their form or nature is of the same ratio.” (38) Hence, a universal is “a 
certain essential similitude in many things (essentialis quaedam in multis simil-
itudo).” Agricola apparently does not distinguish between the essential nature, 
e.g. humanity in Plato, as something Plato possesses, independent of any other 
15) De univ., 37; references will be given in the main text.
16) Agricola knew Porphyry’s Isagoge well; see e.g. DID, 50 (on proprium).
17) Porphyry, Isagoge, translatio Boethii, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, with B. Dodd (Bruges, 1966), 5; 
transl. E. W. Warren (Toronto, 1975), 27-28.
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person or thing, and the likeness on account of which we say that Plato and 
Socrates belong to the same species. If all human beings were destroyed except 
for Plato, one might think that we could still speak of Plato’s humanity, but 
in order to speak of similitudo more than one human being seems to be 
required.
This emphasis on the unity of a universal raises the question of how it can 
be distinguished from a singular thing (this horse, this man), which is also a 
unity, and perhaps even more so. Agricola therefore distinguishes between 
two diﬀerent senses of “singular:”
 (i)  singular in number (= one as opposed to many). Thus, Plato’s humanity, 
taken by itself, is singular, i.e., it is one in number. (Agricola uses various 
terms: “singularitas,” “ unitas naturalis” and “hoc esse.”) In this sense singular 
does not stand in opposition to universal. Each being (ens) has a unity or 
singularity (or ratio).
(ii)  singular can also refer to something that cannot be found anywhere else. 
Agricola speaks of “singulare in causabilitate uel incommunicabilitate,” e.g. 
singular love or the sun’s singular light, but also of Plato being a singular 
man because his substantial property (proprietas substantialis) makes him 
the individual he is, diﬀerent from all other human beings.18 So Plato’s 
humanity is singular in unity—in this sense universal does not stand in 
opposition to singular—but it is in no way “singular in incommunicability,” 
for it is “communicabile,” that is, it is also found in (all) other men.
So we can say that Plato and Socrates are diﬀerent, yet the same—a point that 
Agricola develops by distinguishing between diﬀerent senses of “diﬀerent.” 
Two things can be said to be diﬀerent (diversa) when it is simply true to say 
that the one is not the other. When the one has a certain property by which it 
18) “Causabilitas” can also be found in realist authors such as Wyclif and Raymond Lull; the 
latter often uses “causabilitas;” he was certainly known to Agricola, who comments on the Art 
of Lull in DID, 181. Though critical of his style he praises Lull’s mind; Mack, Renaissance Argu-
ment, 136 n. 20 has suggested that the programme of Lull to unify the arts might have been 
an inspiration for Agricola. “Communicabilitas” occurs frequently in Duns Scotus (also outside 
trinitarian contexts); it also occurs frequently in Johannes de Nova Domo, e.g. in his Tractatus 
universalium but not in the same sense as in Agricola, and in general Johannes’s (Albertist) lan-
guage is diﬀerent from Agricola’s. The same is true, as far as I can see, for Heymericus de Campo. 
For some texts see the discussion in Sophie Włodek, ‘Albert le Grand et les Albertistes du XVe 
siècle. Le problème des universaux’, in Albert der Grosse: Seine Zeit, sein Werk, seine Wirkung, ed. 
A. Zimmermann (Berlin, 1981), 193-207.
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is distinguished from the other, they are not only diversa but also diﬀerentia. 
And when the one exists on its own, apart and separate from the other (seor-
sum per se), we call them not only diversa, diﬀerentia but also discreta, e.g. two 
substances, Plato and Socrates.19
The upshot of the discussion so far is that—as Agricola now concludes—
universals exist outside the soul. The universal in Socrates is similar to that of 
Plato, hence Socrates and Plato are like each other (similes) in that they are of 
the same species. Agricola thinks that the similarity between Plato and Socrates, 
which “everybody can observe,” is not something we make up ourselves but is 
a fact independent of our cognitive faculties.
That the ontological order of essences is independent of our thinking is a 
point that Agricola now starts developing, rather abruptly, by arguing that the 
concepts of the sciences and arts would be meaningless if they would not refer 
to a stable structure of universals in the world. The argument, which is not 
very clear, can perhaps be expressed as follows:
 (a)  The sciences are clearly distinguished from each other.
(b)  They are distinguished from each other by their subjects (res), and these 
diﬀerences are independent of our thinking (semota animi cogitatione aut 
mentis operatione).
The physician, e.g., considers generable and corruptible things rather than the 
concepts (conceptus) of generable and corruptible things. These things are com-
posed of form and matter, and matter is composed of elements, and it would be 
nonsense to think that such things were just the product of our thinking or 
imagination (  ﬁgmentum or opus animi nostri). They are really out there.
(c)  But the sciences are about universals (circa universalia), and the same is true 
for law, philosophy and medicine and other arts and sciences; their precepts 
and commands are “universal and common” (universalia et communia).
19) De univ., 38-39: “Hoc ergo singulare est quod arbitror opponi universali. Singularia ergo 
prioris modi satis est esse diversa. Secundi modi, nedum diuersa, sed et diﬀerentia esse oportet. 
Sane modi distinguendarum rerum tres uidentur esse. Quaecunque enim distinguuntur, aut 
diuersa sunt, id est, quando uerum est dicere, hoc non est illud. Aut diﬀerentia sunt, hoc est, 
quum non solum uerum est dicere, hoc non est illud, sed hoc habet certam proprietatem aut 
notionem adiunctam, qua ab illo discernitur. Tertius distinguendi modus est, quando discreta 
sunt quae distinguuntur, id est, quodque seorsum per se, ab alio diuersum subsistit. Sic duas 
substantias, Socratem et Platonem, distingui dicimus, et non solum ita distinguuntur, sed et 
diﬀerunt etiam, et sunt diuersi.”
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(d)  Hence, universals must be outside the mind if the subjects of arts and sci-
ences are outside the mind.20
It is not quite clear how to interpret this strange argument. Agricola says that 
sciences are about the things themselves rather than about the concepts and 
terms that refer to the things. In this debate between nominalists and their 
critics that was fought in late-medieval schools, Agricola clearly endorses a 
realist position. But his universals appear to be a broad category: it apparently 
includes not only general concepts but—by stretching the meaning of the 
term “universal”—also commands, precepts, general propositions and univer-
sal propositions (what we may now term scientiﬁc laws). The notion of “thing” 
seems a bit ambiguous as well. His example of the physician suggests that he 
thinks of concrete things (this stone, this planet), but is actually thinking of 
universals (the nature or essence of these things). Agricola seems to mix up the 
question of the place of universals (outside the mind?) and the question of the 
object of science (concepts or things?), but though these issues are related they 
are of course not the same. Agricola’s main aim in this section seems fairly 
clear, however: if there were no such common natures, the sciences and arts 
would be about nothing, indeed our thinking and language would be mean-
ingless because they would lack a referent. 
This last point is developed in the next, rather diﬃcult section, though 
again the thrust of his argument is clear enough. If universals are only in the 
mind, they either refer to something outside the mind or not. If not, then we 
have no possibility of distinguishing a purely imaginative concept such as chi-
mera from a concept such as man. If they do refer to something outside the 
mind, then this must be something either of the same character as the univer-
sal—in which case it must also be a universal concept—or it is of a diﬀerent 
nature (habitudo) in which case we are back at the same problem, viz. that we 
do not have a criterion to judge the reality of our concepts (man as opposed to 
chimera). If reality were not structured by common essences, there would be 
nothing to form concepts of; we would never be able to group things together—
reality would consist of a wholly disparate collection of things. Again, we would 
20) De univ., 40: “Semota animi cogitatione aut mentis operatione, sane artes omnes, omnia 
doctrinarum genera distinguuntur, perinde ut distincta sunt ea quae tractant, ea uero res (. . .). 
Quum autem omnes doctrinae aut scientiae sint circa uniuersalia, necesse est uniuersalia aliquid 
esse extra animam, si quae tradantur ab artibus, sunt extra animam aliquid. Praeterea decreta 
legum, philosophorum praecepta, iussa medicorum omnia, uniuersalia et communia sunt, ea 
ergo necesse aut ad nullos pertinere, si nihil commune est in rebus.” Cf. perhaps DID, 209: 
“communia. . .quae iam ueluti leges . . . .”
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be unable to distinguish a concept of chimera, made up of wholly disparate 
parts, and the concept of man, equally made up of disparate parts.21
Having answered his ﬁrst question with which he started his treatise, viz. 
whether universals are something existing outside the mind, Agricola at last 
turns to his second question in the ﬁnal paragraph, whether universals are to 
be distinguished from singulars. His answer is aﬃrmative. A universal is not 
the same as a singular. Socrates and Plato are the same in being humans, but 
they are diﬀerent in that each is a singular being having his own speciﬁc prop-
erty added to the universal (notio uel proprietas addita humanitati), what the 
school of Duns Scotus (Ioannis Scoti secta) calls a “diﬀerentia individualis.” 
(Agricola does not use the word “haeceitas,” this-ness here.) Moreover, we can 
recognize a man coming our way without (yet) noticing that it is Plato. That 
the two are not the same is also clear from the fact that the universal is “com-
municabile,” that is common to many things, while a singular is not. The same 
position can be supported by “the testimonies of many great philosophers,” 
but Agricola rests the case here, since it was not his intention “to examine 
what others had said but rather to investigate what can be said most truly and 
most in conformity with the nature of things (ad rerum naturam).”
3. A Scotist background?
Though brief and simple, we can make several observations about this treatise. 
It is quite clear that Agricola favors a realist position, but it is much less clear 
what for him universals exactly are. His argument that our concepts, in order 
to make sense, must correspond to universals existing outside the mind, seems 
to leave him with two types of universals: the concept man, which we know 
21) De univ., 40: “Ad haec si sint uniuersalia tantum in anima, utrum dicemus aliquid eis extra 
animam in re respondere, aut nihil? Si nihil, non dicemus quicquam interesse inter conceptum 
Chymerae et hominis, quum perinde uterque sit inanis, et cui nihil in re solidi aut certi subdit 
de quo formetur. At si dicimus subesse aliquid in re, illud aut dicimus tale esse quale conceptum 
est, aut alterius habitudinis, si tale dicamus, quum sit uniuersale, conceptum erit et universale. 
Si alterius habitudinis, nihil intererit rursus inter hominem et Chymeram (. . .) Quid enim refert 
utrum mens nostra ea quae prorsus diﬀerunt et in nullo conueniunt, in uno communi coniun-
gat, quum inter se penitus discrepent, an partes Chymerae dissidentis et quae in unam formam 
cogi non possunt, in unius corporis formas coactas esse conﬁngat? Quod si ergo inter Chymerae 
conceptum et hominis et reliquorumque uniuersalium multum interest, et quae a legibus, phi-
losophis et medicis statuuntur in commune, complectuntur multa, et traduntur multis com-
muniter faciunda, non solum de multis concipiuntur, et artes scientiaeque quae de rebus extra 
animam et de uniuersalibus idem diﬀerunt uniuersaliaque tractant.”
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we possess, and the metaphysical universal man that exists in but is not identi-
cal with individual persons. But he also writes about the latter in terms of 
(substantial) properties—as if humanity is a real existing property of Socrates, 
and also in terms of likenesses or similitudes. In other words, Agricola does 
not distinguish clearly between the logical concept, which, as he admits him-
self, is of course a product of our thinking, and an ontological entity. Though 
his ﬁrst question as well as the argument he develops by way of answer suggest 
that universals exist only outside the soul, this is not the case: universals also 
exist in our mind, but the fact that there is an obvious diﬀerence between 
purely ﬁctive concepts such as chimera and concepts with a fundamentum in 
re such as horse and man proves for Agricola that there must be universals that 
constitute this fundamentum in re for our concepts. Yet he does not tell us 
what the relationship between the two is nor how we acquire our concepts. He 
seems simply to presuppose a kind of mind-world identity. Unlike, for 
instance, Aquinas who spoke of a formal identity between our concepts (the 
intelligible species) and the forms or universals in things, Agricola does not 
develop his argument in this direction; indeed, he does not present us with 
anything more than a rough sketch (sylvula in Alardus’s words), hardly more 
than a realist’s credo; after all, it was only a rough draft that he had left, as its 
editor Alardus of Amsterdam conﬁrmed. Agricola thus calls the ontological 
universal, which is independent of our thinking (as he repeatedly says), rather 
than our mental concept, “an essential similitude.” 
Agricola is in good company, however. The classic account by Boethius suf-
fers from the same ambiguity. Boethius’s answer to Porphyry’s dilemma 
whether universals really exist or are formed by the intellect alone is that it is 
not the one or the other but that we can have it both ways.22 Universals have 
a double existence: they exist both in particular things and as concepts in our 
mind. The mind abstracts cathood after observing many cats, noticing the 
similitude between them, and forming the concept of cathood. The concept 
would be null and void if there would be nothing in extramental reality that 
corresponded to that concept. But Boethius does not want to give up the 
Aristotelian principle that everything that exists is one in number. Hence, 
universals must be said to be particular as sensed in particular things—
they might be identiﬁed with the “likenesses” between things—but universal 
as grasped in thought. In essence, this is more or less the position we also 
ﬁnd in Agricola. But Agricola sounds like a true realist when he stresses the 
22) For a convenient text see P. V. Spade, Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals 
(Indianapolis, Ind., 1994), 20-25.
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independent existence of the ontological order of universals that exists wholly 
independent from our thinking, and also when his endorsement of the diﬀer-
ence between the universal humanity and the diﬀerentia individualis that 
makes Plato the individual that he is implies that the universal is not an indi-
vidual thing even though he has tried to show that it was a unity itself too. 
But rather than Thomas or Boethius it is Duns Scotus that comes to mind, 
and indeed, as we have seen, Agricola links himself with the school of the 
Scotists.23 In Scotus too, as Timothy Noone remarks, “the logical treatment of 
universals cannot be entirely disentangled from the metaphysical one, since 
Scotus’s interpretation of the properly logical treatment is intimately con-
nected with his own ontology.”24 Agricola’s treatise is too brief and too ele-
mentary to trace clear debts to Scotus or Scotist teaching, but the introduction 
of the notion of “individual diﬀerence” that somehow combines with the spe-
ciﬁc nature (e.g. man) to form a substantial unity is of course typically a Sco-
tist one, though Scotus did not think the haecceity is a property or accident. 
According to Scotus, this individual diﬀerence, which each individual being 
has, is incommunicable in that it is something that cannot become part of 
something else; it cannot compose something other than the individual being 
that it individuates.25 Agricola’s distinction between the several meanings of 
23) Scotus was allowed at Louvain by a decision of 1446, as mentioned by J. Papy, ‘The reception 
of Agricola’s De inventione dialectica in the teaching of logic at the Louvain faculty of arts in the 
early sixteenth century’, in Northern Humanism in European Context, 1469-1625, ed. F. Akker-
man et al. (Leiden, 1999), 169, n. 12, while Ockham “was a stranger in Louvain and remained 
as such in the commentaries [on Aristotle’s Organon] of 1535” (170). Maarten Dorp, however, 
was able to praise Ockham in glowing terms in a treatise from 1512, as D. Verbeke suggests in 
a forthcoming article on Dorp.
24) Timothy B. Noone, ‘Universals and Individuation’, in the Cambridge Companion to Duns 
Scotus, ed. T. Williams (Cambridge, 2006),100-128, on 105 also referring to C. Marmo, 
‘Ontology and Semantics in the Logic of Duns Scotus’, in On the Medieval Theory of Signs, ed. 
U. Eco and C. Marmo (Philadelphia, 1989), 143-193. This is not to say that Scotus does not 
distinguish clearly between the universal as the object of the intellect and as it is outside the soul: 
“that which-is (quod quid est) is the per se object of the intellect, is considered per se as such by 
the metaphysician, and is expressed through a deﬁnition . . . Not only, however, is the nature 
indiﬀerent to being in the intellect and in the particular (and thereby to universal being and 
particular, or singular, being), but also, when it ﬁrst has being in the intellect, it does not have 
universality in its own right (. . .) And just as the object in its ﬁrst presence and ‘universality’ in 
the intellect has truly intelligible being (esse intelligibile), so too in reality the nature has, accord-
ing to its entity, true real being outside the soul. . . .” (Ord. 2, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1, nn. 32-4, transl. 
Noone, 109)
25) Cf. Jorge J. E. Garcia, ‘Individuality and the Individuating Entity in Scotus’s Ordinatio: An 
Ontological Characterization’, in John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and Ethics, ed. L. Honnefelder 
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unity as well as the distinction between diversa, diﬀerentia and discreta may 
also have been inspired by Scotist teaching, though Scotus himself had distin-
guished between numerical unity and the unity of common nature, arguing 
that the latter is “less than numerical unity” (minor unitas), because it is indif-
ferent to singularity.26 Also, Scotus had argued that “the individual diﬀerences 
are primarily and simply diverse, although the individuals constituted by those 
diﬀerences are items sharing the same speciﬁc nature, just as the items in the 
diﬀerent species share in the genus despite the fact that they are constituted in 
their respective species by diﬀerences that are primarily diverse.”27 The com-
munity that universals have “apart from the intellect,” as Scotus emphasizes,28 
is also a point on which Agricola, in his own way, insists. In the case of Scotus this 
does not imply a full-bodied realism but rather, as Olivier Boulnois has argued,29 
a conceptualism of universals combined with a realism of community: 
la même nature qui est dans la chose, et qui y existe de manière singulière, peut devenir 
universelle par sa relation à l’intellect, ce qui est une pure relation de raison, une relation du 
connu au connaissant. L’universalité est une pure relation: elle est dans l’intellect le rapport 
de l’intelligible aux choses,—relation évidemment dissymétrique, qui ne change rien du 
côté de la chose, à son intelligibilité propre, mais qui est constitutive, du côté de l’intellect, 
de intentio comme telle. Scot va jusqu’à dire que l’intellect est la cause eﬃciente de l’univer-
sel, tandis que la chose en est le sujet, la cause matérielle ou l’occasion. L’intellect donne 
l’être à l’universel, tandis que la chose lui communique un contenu. La chose est bien un 
substrat, un fondement pour l’universel, mais l’intellect lui donne son mode d’être, et lui 
permet d’exister indépendamment de la chose même. L’universel peut ne pas exister dans 
la chose (il peut être l’objet d’un acte de mémoire, d’anticipation, de construction intellec-
tuelle), mais il ne peut pas ne pas être dans l’intellect.30
The nature or essence, existing as singular in things, can become universal by 
its relationship with the intellect. It is the intellect that gives the nature its 
being, its universal character, its community, and it is even said to be the 
et al. (Leiden, 1996), 246, citing Scotus, Ord. q.6 n. 189, Vatican Edition 7:484; Noone, ‘Uni-
versals and Individuation’, 100-128.
26) Gracia, ‘Individuality and the Individuating Entity’, 235 citing Ord. II d. 3 p. 1 q. 6 n. 172, 
Vatican Edition 7:476.
27) Noone, ‘Universals and Individuation’, 121; Gracia, ‘Individuality and the Individuating 
Entity’, 246-47.
28) Ord. 2, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1, n. 42, cited by Noone, ‘Universals and Individuation’, 110.
29) ‘Réelles intentions: nature commune et universaux selon Duns Scot’, Revue de Métaphysique 
et de Morale 1 (1992), 3–33, in particular 28-33 on the importance of community for Scotus’s 
doctrine of universals.
30) ‘Réelles intentions’, 30.
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eﬃcient cause of the universal: the thing is the foundation, the substratum of 
the universal, but it is the intellect that gives it its mode of being and makes 
its existence, independent of the thing itself, possible. Boulnois thus concludes 
that it is wrong to call Scotus an extreme realist, as has traditionally been done; 
Scotus’s position steers a middle course between conceptualism and realism. 
It is a form of moderate realism.
A critical reader of Scotus may still be justiﬁed in doubting whether Scotus 
always manages to stay clear of the Charybdis of robust realism and the Scylla 
of pure conceptualism. But for our purpose we need not further delve into the 
intricacies of Scotist metaphysics to detect a Scotist inspiration in Agricola’s 
little treatise on universals, though it is probably true to say that he did not 
make a deliberate choice for one realist school (Scotism) above the other (e.g. 
Albertism).31 The source of inspiration may have been fairly general, limited as 
it seems to have been to terminology such as “causabilitas” and “incommuni-
cabilitas” and the doctrine of the individual diﬀerence. Agricola does not men-
tion, e.g., the formal distinction nor does he use the term “haeceitas,” though 
he knew the term (his opponent used it, on which see below).32 But he seems 
to follow Scotist teaching in thinking that universals as common natures exist 
independent of the intellect but that “community” is something that arises 
only because the mind notices and judges things as similar in a particular 
respect. As Thomas Williams summarizes Scotus’s position: 
The common nature is common in that it is ‘indiﬀerent’ to existing in any number of 
individuals. But it has extra-mental existence only in the particular things in which it exists, 
and in them it is always ‘contracted’ by the haecceity. So the common nature humanity 
exists in both Socrates and Plato, although in Socrates it is made individual by Socrates’s 
haecceitas and in Plato by Plato’s haecceitas. The humanity-of-Socrates is individual and 
non-repeatable, as is the humanity-of-Plato; yet humanity itself is common and repeatable, 
and it is ontologically prior to any particular exempliﬁcation of it.33
This is not very diﬀerent from Agricola’s view, though we do not ﬁnd him 
explicitly arguing for an ontological priority of the common nature to any 
particular exempliﬁcation.
31) Without exploring a possible Scotist background as I have tried to do here, Braakhuis is 
right, I think, in saying that Agricola does not make “a choice between the diﬀerent schools 
of realistic thought, e.g. Albertism or Scotism” (‘Agricola’s View on Universals’, 246), but see 
n. 18 above. 
32) Phaselus to Agricola, f. 203v. 
33) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/duns-scotus.
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This brings me to a ﬁnal observation. The student of humanist rhetoric and 
dialectic who holds to the traditional view of humanism as the very opposite 
of scholasticism in method and terminology will be surprised to ﬁnd Agricola 
singing the praises of such a quintessentially scholastic thinker as Scotus.34 But 
of course there was much interaction between scholastics and humanists; sev-
eral of the theologians who were teaching in the Bursae in Cologne, well known 
to Agricola, had humanist interests., e.g. the prominent German humanist and 
friend of Agricola, Rudolf von Langen—to mention just one example—was a 
good friend of the Albertists in Cologne at the Bursa laurentiana, and full of 
admiration of Albert the Great, and so were their rivals in the Bursa montana 
full of admiration of Thomas Aquinas.35 Nor should it come as a surprise to 
see Agricola using scholastic terms such as “causabilitas” and “incommunica-
bilitas.” In a letter to Alexander Hegius from 1480 Agricola had confessed 
that, in opposition to Valla, “I myself could conceivably say Socratitas and 
Platonitas and entitas, although Valla would object,” and indeed he explicitly 
defends the term “quiditas” in the De inventione dialectica (though this is the 
only place where such a term occurs).36 As we have just seen, the early Agricola 
was even bolder in using scholastic terminology, and we do not ﬁnd him here 
appealing to the linguistic usage (consuetudo) of the great authors or our cus-
tomary way of talking to control the meanings of terms.
4. The debate between Agricola and Phaselus
We do not know when Agricola wrote this treatise on universals, but a response 
to it, written by a certain and otherwise completely unknown “philosopher” 
Phaselus, points to a time when Agricola was still studying the arts in Erfurt 
and in Louvain, that is, before he went to Italy at the end of the 1460s to study 
law and especially the bonae litterae. Phaselus’s response, entitled sententia 
Phaseli philosophi de universali singulari et uno ad Rodolphum scripta in the 
manuscript, is written in a curious and often incomprehensible Latin that 
34) DID, 155 and 168. The second reference strongly suggests that Agricola had really studied 
Scotus himself: “Ioannes Scotus itaque solet persaepe, sicubi perplexior quaestio incidit, velut 
expositionis loco praeponere formam imaginandae rei.” See also n. 23 above. 
35) For Agricola’s letters to Von Langen, see nos. 3 and 14 in Letters, ed. A. van der Laan and 
F. Akkerman (Assen, 2002). See Tewes, Die Bursen der Kölner Artisten-Fakultät, 715-17.
36) See the letter no. 21 in Agricola, Letters, 130-31, referring to Cicero’s use of “Appietas” and 
“Lentulitas.” On quiditas see De inventione dialectica, 238. Cf. A. Wesseling, ‘Agricola and Word 
Explanation’, in Rodolphus Agricola Phrisius, 230-31 (not referring to the treatises on universals). 
Nauta, In Defense of Common Sense, 79-81.
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combines a scholastic and a (proto)humanistic Latin.37 Agricola himself prob-
ably thought it incomprehensible too, limiting his discussion to Phaselus’s 
argument on universals. His response shows something of the quiet and 
respectful way of disputing with an opponent that his biographer Gerardus 
Geldenhouwer ascribed to him.38 Agricola cites and discusses Phaselus’s argu-
ment on the latter’s own terms, which makes his text rather diﬃcult, also 
because his own Latin has not yet achieved the clarity of his later works and 
because the text, as noticed, came down in a corrupt draft. He basically repeats 
his original position, making use of his distinctions of diﬀerent senses of “sin-
gular,” “individual,” “common,” and the distinction between diversa, diﬀeren-
tia and discreta. I will discuss its main points as this text has not been studied 
before.
Agricola begins his exposition by discussing the concept of “communicabil-
ity” because “a universal is nothing else than one thing common to many 
things,” or to translate literally: “one communicable to many” (unum com-
municabile multis). (Agricola seems to use “commune” and “communicabile” 
interchangeably.) After having distinguished several meanings of “something 
in common,” Agricola states what a universal is: “a universal is nothing else 
than one thing whose likeness is found in many things” (unum cuius similitudo 
reperitur in multis). This does not mean one in number, however, but one in 
the sense that many things share the same quality, quantity, essence, species or 
genus. Such similar things can be called “conformes” or “conformia.” On this 
point he and Phaselus seem to agree, he says, but they do not agree on the 
ontological diﬀerence between an individual, species and genus. Introducing 
a horse called Rhebus, he says: “I distinguish this nature of animal from the 
nature of horse in the horse and the nature of the horse from the nature of 
Rhebus in Rhebus (. . .) I say that the being by which Rhebus is called animal 
is diﬀerent from that by which it is called a horse and diﬀerent again from which 
it is called Rhebus.”39 This is the point that Phaselus denies, and Agricola starts 
37) I made a transcript but have refrained from adding it to Agricola’s reply in the appendix. 
38) Geldenhouwer, ‘Vita Agricolae’, in J. Fichardus, Virorum qui superiori nostroque seculo erudi-
tione et doctrina illustres atque memorabiles fuerunt vitae (Frankfurt, 1536), f. 84. Agricola is also 
reported to have said that he regretted to have spent seven full years on this cavilling and useless 
art of the scholastics; ‘Vitae Agricolae’, in J. B. Kan, ‘Wesseli Groningensis, Rodolphi Agricolae, 
Erasmi Roterodami Vitae . . .’, Erasmiani Gymnasii programma Litterarium (Rotterdam, 1894), 7.
39) Agricola to Phaselus, f. 206r: “Sed hanc animalis naturam ab equi natura in equo et equi 
naturam a Rhebi <natura> in Rhebo distingui, id prorsus uidetur, in quo nobis non conuenit, 
hoc est: ego aliud esse a quo Rhebus animal a quo equus a quo Rhebus uocetur dico, id tu negas;” 
see appendix.
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to review Phaselus’s argument in some detail, quoting sentences from the lat-
ter’s text. Phaselus’s main argument seems to be that essences can never be 
common: the humanity of Socrates is something individual and singular, and 
it does not need an additional, extrinsic quality (such as an individual quality) 
in order to be such an individual (see below). Agricola’s aim is to show that 
while such a humanity indeed is an individual thing in a particular sense of the 
term, it is not suﬃcient to make, e.g., Socrates the individual he is, diﬀerent 
from Plato. 
He ﬁrst quotes an argument from Phaselus to the eﬀect that likeness (in the 
sense of Socrates is like/similar to Plato) is a type of relation, or a relatiua 
oppositio. Aristotle had indeed said that relatives (such as double and half, and 
knowledge and the knowable) are one out of four kinds of opposition.40 Phase-
lus therefore thinks that Agricola’s own deﬁnition of universal as a similitude 
implies that, e.g., the humanity of Socrates is diﬀerent from that of Plato, even 
if there is no individual diﬀerentia added to it. This might also be the reason 
why Phaselus had ironically started his treatise “to thank” Agricola for sup-
porting his position against all realists and Scotists.41 Obviously, Agricola has 
to qualify this. He replies that he has never denied that the humanity in 
Socrates and the humanity in Plato are numerically diﬀerent (numero diver-
sas); indeed, it is true to say that the one is not the other. The diﬃculty is 
caused by the fact that we can say of a universal both that it is “one in num-
ber” when “one” is taken to mean “not many” and “not one in number” when 
one is taken to mean “incommunicabile,” for a universal is not “incommunica-
bile,” indeed it is its opposite; a universal is “communicabile,” that is common 
to many things. This is indeed the distinction Agricola had made in his treatise 
on universals, to which he explicitly harks back: the humanity of Socrates and 
the humanity of Plato are diﬀerent (in the sense that the one is not the other), 
and each of them is singular and one, and yet—and this is crucial—they are 
not singulars by a “singularity of incommunicability” in the way he had explained 
these terms in his “treatise recently given to you by me.”42
Phaselus continues with a curious argument, quoted by Agricola. Starting 
with Agricola’s own premise that Socrates’s humanity is “essentially similar” 
(essentialiter simile) to Plato’s humanity (by Phaselus called “a” and “b”), he 
40) Aristotle, Categories 11b24-b33.
41) Phaselus to Agricola, f. 203r: “Cum dicitur ut sit uniuersale nihil aliud quam essentiale que-
dam in multis ut ita dicam similitudo, primum gratias habeo quod huius mee sententie tantam 
contra reales omnes et formales habeam propugnationem.”
42) Agricola to Phaselus, f. 206v; see appendix.
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draws the conclusion that a and b must be utterly diﬀerent ( prorsus diuersas), 
because if one were the same as the other, they would not be similar to each 
other. Phaselus’s point seems to be that similarity presupposes non-identity: 
we can only speak of similarity between two things when the two are not the 
same, which Phaselus leads to conclude—rather quickly, one would think—
that they must be entirely diﬀerent per se (per se prorsus diuersa). Agricola 
qualiﬁes this argument ﬁrst by pointing out that strictly speaking it is not 
humanity that is similar to humanity, but that Socrates is similar to Plato 
because of their humanity. For the sake of argument, however, Agricola is 
prepared to accept this way of talking (hic modus loquendi) and the conclusion 
that a cannot be b. But when Phaselus adds that all similar things belong to 
the category of relation (ad aliquid), which he uses as support for his conclu-
sion that a and b are “per se prorsus diuersa,” Agricola thinks that this step is 
not valid, though he admits that he does not quite understand what Phaselus 
is saying. Agricola’s paraphrase of Phaselus’s curious argument may be set out 
as follows:
1.  humanities a and b are similar (similes)
2.  all similar things are relatives (ad aliquid)
3.  relatives are all such things as are said to be just what they are, of other 
things, or in some other way in relation to something else (part of the Aris-
totelian deﬁnition)43
4.  but the two humanities (a and b) are relatives
5.  hence they are just what they are, of other things (earum hoc ipsum esse 
quod sunt aliorum est)
6.  hence, they are diﬀerent from each other (per se diuerse).
Without denying that a and b—insofar as they are similar things—are diﬀer-
ent from each other, Agricola wants to keep open the possibility of saying that 
a and b—insofar as they are both humanities—are not diﬀerent, so that Phase-
lus’s argument on likenesses as relatives is to no avail. Agricola’s reply is diﬃ-
cult to understand as well. He ﬁrst distinguishes between a concrete and an 
abstract sense of the indeclinable expression “ad aliquid.” In its concrete sense 
it refers to the terms of the relation (the relata), in its abstract sense to the rela-
tion itself. When Phaselus says that “all similar things are relatives (ad aliquid ),” 
43) Aristotle, Categories 11b24, transl. Boethius: “Ad aliquid uero talia dicuntur quaecumque 
hoc ipsum quod sunt aliorum dicuntur, uel quomodolibet aliter ad aliud . . . ;” Aristoteles, Cat-
egoriae vel Praedicamenta: translatio Boethii . . . , ed. L. Minio-Paluello (Brugues, 1961), 18.
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that is are related things (relata), Agricola has no problem with that, but when 
Phaselus adds that “relatives are those things of which one thing is said to be 
of something else,” this cannot be true for all relatives, for though, e.g., father 
and son are related, “they are independent items, and one is not of the other 
(independens et quod non sit alterius).” This does not mean that a and b are 
“utterly diﬀerent,” because as humanities a and b do not diﬀer, even though 
as likenesses they are relatives and hence diﬀer. Agricola’s point is not well 
expressed but becomes clearer in what follows.
Phaselus claims that essences such as a and b are individual things, diﬀerent 
from each other, which do not need any extrinsic feature “below (deorsum)” 
that individuates them nor “above (superius)” that makes them “univocal and 
uniﬁed” (univocante et uniente). What he may have in mind is that there is no 
individual property such as Platoness required to make the humanity of Plato 
a unique, independent thing, nor a higher unifying form such as Plato’s ani-
mality. The fact that Phaselus adds “deorsum” (below) means, so Agricola 
thinks, that he is using “individual” in the sense of something incommunica-
bile, that is something “of which a similar essence is not found in anything 
else.” For we call something common to many things not because it is one in 
number in these many things but because many things are similar to that 
thing (conformabilia in eo): these things are one by assimilation. Something is 
therefore called an individual not because it is one in number—because every-
thing that is is one in number—but because it is “the opposite of universal or 
common.” We thus see Agricola repeating more or less the same distinction 
between two senses of individual: horse and man are similar or like each other 
insofar as they both have animality even though the animality in this particu-
lar man is diﬀerent from that in this particular horse: they are diﬀerent in 
number because “the one is not the other,” and they are diﬀerent in species 
because there is something else that attains to both of them. But two things 
cannot be diﬀormia and conformia in the same respect. Hence a and b (the 
animality of horse and of man) are comformia in that they are both animal, 
which means that in this very same respect of sharing animality they cannot 
be diﬀerent as well; the diﬀerence must be sought elsewhere, which lies of 
course in their having a diﬀerent species. “Horse diﬀers from man because of 
its horseness and man diﬀers from horse because of humanity.” 
The point seems trivial but for Agricola it provides the answer to Phaselus, 
who, as we have seen, had claimed that animalities a and b diﬀer and do not 
need anything extrinsic to make them individual. They diﬀer (diuerse) indeed, 
that is, the one is not the other, but in order make them singular things it 
is necessary to add a speciﬁc diﬀerence. The two animalities would not be 
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dissimilar unless humanity is added to the one and horseness to the other. And 
also among two humanities: “Socrates diﬀers from Plato not only because he 
is not Plato but also because he has a property by which Socrates, insofar as he 
is Socrates, is diﬀormis from Plato (insofar as the latter is Plato). And this is the 
diﬀerence of which we have said it is individual.” It is this addition that ren-
ders each of them something unique and “incommunicable.”
Agricola’s response to Phaselus does not add very much to what we have 
already learned from his ﬁrst treatise, and all in all we cannot call it an impor-
tant or philosophically deep discussion. But the fact that Agricola keeps ﬁrm 
to his position tells us something of the commitment he feels toward it: he 
tries to do justice to the individuality of things while at the same time believ-
ing that the common patterns we see are grounded in extra-mental reality. It 
is this conviction that informs his De inventione dialectica as well, to which we 
will turn now.
5. From De universalibus to De inventione dialectica
The heart of Agricola’s theory of argumentation are the loci, and his treatment 
of them demonstrates his practical bent of mind. First and foremost he wants 
to teach his readers how to argue and how to speak convincingly about a sub-
ject, and how to lay bare the argumentative structure of a text, and so on. As 
noticed in §1, philosophical questions of how these patterns of argumenta-
tions might reﬂect or are grounded in reality do not belong to his program.44 
Yet the topics, as Agricola knows full well, include a number of items that play 
an important role in metaphysics and other parts of philosophy: “dialectics 
receive its terms from metaphysics, and it is metaphysics that shows dialectics 
what they are, but it is the task of dialectics to treat of things in an orderly way 
and to judge them” with the aid of topics.45 It is not surprising therefore that 
Agricola’s treatment of the topics shows—in line with tradition—a certain 
ontological slant: topics refer to internal or external, necessary or contingent 
aspects of a thing. Thus we have “internal” topics, which are “within the sub-
stance of a thing” (e.g. genus, species, property/diﬀerence, whole, part) or 
“bring a certain manner or disposition to it” (adjacents, actions, subject) and 
we have “external” topics, which refer to “necessarily joined aspects” (e.g. causes, 
eﬀects, place, time) or “accidents which can exist with or without a thing” 
44) At various places Agricola writes that some of the more theoretical issues are out of place in 
his discussion, e.g. DID, 18 and 81.
45) DID: “ratio rerum iudiciumque,” 210.
 L. Nauta / Vivarium 50 (2012) 190-224 211
(e.g. contingents, similars/dissimilars) and those that are joined to the thing 
“without necessity” (e.g. opposites). The further subdivisions need not detain 
us here, but it is evident that topics refer to aspects of a thing or describe 
aspects “around” it.46 Elsewhere Agricola speaks of loci as showing us the way 
or as penetrating into the “nature of things,” or even into “the intimate and 
hidden nature of things.” And they also oﬀer us ways of dividing things, e.g. 
the diﬀerentia rationality divides rational from non-rational beings.47 
The foundation of the topics in the things themselves does not automati-
cally entail philosophical realism, and we ﬁnd Agricola saying that genus and 
species are predicated of a thing, just as the topics are headings under which 
we are invited to view and discuss whatever thing.48 Yet many of Agricola’s 
formulations show a ﬂuid transition from speaking about the things them-
selves and the topics that are based on them; genus and species are more than 
concepts or general headings under which to review a thing or case; they seem 
real aspects of that thing. He also talks frequently about “the nature of things” 
or “the inner essence of a thing,” even though, as he admits, that often eludes 
us: the true nature of things often “remains hidden from us,” and hence argu-
ments directly based on the substance or causes of things are often very hard 
to ﬁnd.49 
But even though the nature of individual things might often elude us, we 
can observe the similarities and disagreements between things, and in fact this 
human capacity is central to Agricola’s account of argumentation: to argue 
that A is a B means showing what they have in common. Hence, dialectic is 
all about ﬁnding such agreements and disagreements between things, events 
or cases.50 But these agreements are based on the things themselves. Our 
46) DID, 22-24; cf. also DID, 24: “mihi naturam ordinemque rerum sequenti” at the start 
of his discussion of the topics (which looks similar to the ending of De univ., 41: “ad rerum 
naturam”).
47) DID, 72, 93, 146. See also DID, 44 on diﬀerentia.
48) DID, 34 and 35, and passim.
49) DID, 171; cf. 44 for an apparently ﬂuid transition from topics as saying something about real 
aspects of things to topics as signs. The limits of human understanding are stressed e.g. in DID, 
2 (Academy), 26 (lack of true diﬀerentiae), 35 (idem), 43 (diﬃculty of ﬁnding true diﬀerentiae), 
72, 163, 207 (Academy). Mack, Renaissance Argument, 177-81 argues that Agricola was not a 
sceptic, at least not in the strict sense, “in that, although he believed that most things are not 
certain, for him the probabile included the certain,” pace L. Jardine, ‘Lorenzo Valla and the intel-
lectual origins of humanist dialectic’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 15 (1977), 143-163. 
50) To deﬁne a thing we must know that thing and its natura or habitudo, which means that we 
must know in what it agrees and disagrees with other things; DID, 27; see also Agricola, Laus 
philosophie, ed. Alardus, II, 151.
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categorizations are not a matter of human invention. Although the variety of 
things is immense, and man’s power to know the inner essences of things 
limited, we have the capacity to observe and recognize the similarities between 
things, their common condition or nature. As Agricola explains:
all things which are said either for or against something ﬁt together and are, so to speak, 
joined with it by a certain community of nature (quadam naturae societate). Now the num-
ber of things is immense and consequently the number of their properties (proprietas) and 
diﬀerences (diversitas) is also immense. This is the reason why no discourse and no power 
of the human mind can comprehend individually all the relations in which individuals 
agree and diﬀer. However a certain common condition (communis quaedam habitudo) is 
present in all things (even though they are diﬀerent in their appearances), and they all tend 
to a similarity of their nature (naturae similitudinem). So, for example, every thing has a 
certain substance of its own, certain causes from which it arises, certain eﬀects it produces. 
And so the cleverest men have picked out (excerpsere), out of that vast variety of things, these 
common headings (communia capita) such as substance, cause, eﬀect and the others . . .51
As “common headings” the topics refer to the common condition of things: 
each thing belongs to a genus, has a certain substance, is caused by something, 
has a certain eﬀect, is at a certain place and so on. Some of the Aristotelian 
categories and the predicables are thus included in the list of topics, but the 
topics contain more than the traditional set of universals; they are rather uni-
versal aspects of things, and hence a good starting point for speaking about 
them.52
We are now in a better position to see the common ground between his 
early work on universals and his De inventione dialectica. It goes probably too 
far to see in the early treatise the “Grundlage” for the De inventione dialectica;53 
Agricola’s principal sources of the De inventione dialectica—Aristotle, Cicero, 
Quintilian and Boethius—are more important than his own little treatise on 
universals. Yet his understanding of the topics clearly owes something to these 
earlier thoughts about universals. In both works Agricola emphasizes the com-
mon aspects of things that enables us to categorize and talk about things without 
51) DID, 9; cf. Mack, Renaissance Argument, 140. Agricola frequently says that things have their 
own nature, power and function, e.g. “nativa enim est quaedam omnibus adiacens vis” (64) and 
“omniaque propositum sibi destinatumque ﬁnem” (79). Things behave in a predictable and 
regular way because they have a particular ontological structure.
52) Agricola, at one point, equates the order of things with the order of the categories: “at illa 
[homo and virtus] toto rerum ordine, hoc est, praedicamentis, sunt diducta” (154). Substance is 
called the “receptacle and foundation of every thing” (76); magnitude plays the role of subject 
for the other accidental categories, called “adiacentia” in Agricola’s system (76).
53) See n. 6 above.
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denying the fundamental unicity and individuality of things. But while in his 
early treatise he talked about universals as essential similitudes, in the De 
inventione dialectica they have become the loci of his dialectical system: the 
topics as labels of the general features that things share (or do not share). There 
is an ambiguity, however: A and B can have something in common, e.g. both 
are yellow, but this universal is not to be identiﬁed with the topic contingent 
that has led the mind to look for common accidents in A and B. Similarly, the 
genus animality in a horse is not identical with the topic genus that has led the 
mind to look for the type of genus in that horse.
This ambiguity can arise because Agricola describes the invention of topics 
in much the same way as the noticing of universals as common features of 
things. “Wise men” have noticed that all things consist of a substance, and 
hence have selected substance as a common heading, a locus, which can be used 
in argumentation. In much the same way we ﬁnd horse and dog similar 
because we notice, using the topic of genus, that both are animals. In both 
cases Agricola uses a similar kind of terminology: the treatise states that we can 
ﬁnd (reperiri) universals by noticing common characteristics of things, while 
the De inventione dialectica speaks of picking out (excerpsere) the common 
headings.54 Perhaps Agricola presupposes a process of abstraction by which we 
come to know universals and the loci, but he does not spell out the mechanism 
let alone describe it in terms of sensible and intelligible species and phantasms. 
It seems as if man must develop a kind of intuition to see the diﬀerences and 
agreements between things, an intuition that can be learned and sharpened by 
practice (usus, 89; cf. 76), and prudence is deﬁned in these very same terms, 
namely seeing what a thing is and how it diﬀers and agrees with other things, 
to what it can lead and from what it comes (3). The topics aid us in noticing 
these common features: they direct the mind to notice certain aspects of real-
ity, leading the way to clear thinking, reasoning and writing (3).55 The mind 
investigates the multifarious phenomena registered by the senses, bringing 
forth (elicere), distinguishing and ordering “all the forms of things and their 
common conditions (habitudines) and kinds,” while also putting them into 
the several branches of the arts and sciences.56 Given the immense richness of 
54) Cf. Friedrich, ‘“War Rudolf Agricola Nominalist?”’, 379 and Kessler, ‘Die verborgene 
Gegenwart Ockhams’, 152 and 160 n. 51, without referring to what I see as an ambiguity in 
Agricola’s account.
55) DID, 86: “certiore nanque cursu intentionem mentis diriget.” 
56) Agricola has an empirical bent of mind; he frequently advises observing things carefully, with 
sense perception and intellectual cognition working together (65). See DID, 75: “Quae mens 
nostra deinde accepta a sensibus cognoscit primum, deinde varie multipliciterque composita 
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the phenomena (varie multipliciterque composita inter se atque divisa) it is all 
the more important to have a system of topics, derived from a consideration 
of things, that functions as a kind of lens that enables us to notice and explore 
common patterns and structures. 
This talk of common patterns and structures may seem a bit loose, but as 
we have seen Agricola himself includes a number of “general and common” 
precepts, commands and laws under the umbrella of universal: each discipline 
works with common notions. In the De inventione dialectica the wide applica-
bility of topics in all kinds of disciplines is stressed as well: topics are not only 
relevant for oratory but also for law, medicine, philosophy and science (93).
When we come to Agricola’s discussion of the relevant topics of similarity, 
opposites and diﬀerentia, we do not ﬁnd him repeating verbatim the same 
distinctions and terminology from the earlier treatise. “Similars” are illustrated 
by what we could now call an analogy (133), though at another place similia 
are said—more in line with the treatise on universals—to be things that have 
a quality in common (103). In his discussion of the topics of opposites and 
diﬀerentia, Agricola does not repeat his earlier distinction between singular in 
number (= one as opposed to many) and singular “in causabilitate uel incom-
municabilitate” in exactly these terms but distinguishes between opposites 
(one opposed to one, e.g. cold to warm) and diﬀerentia (one opposed to many, 
e.g. a species as “opposed” to the other species falling under the same genus, 
161), referring also to Aristotle’s distinction of four types of opposites (155, 
Categories 11b24-b33; for a threefold way of dividing a unity; see 45). Nor 
does he use his earlier distinction on diversa, diﬀerentia, and discreta in the chap-
ter on the topic of diﬀerentia.57 A brief discussion of diﬀerences at the level of 
individuals, species, genus and category leads to a recognition of the ambigu-
inter se atque divisa, formas omnes rerum habitudinesque et genera ordinemque cunctorum 
elicit, discernit, disponit inque varios artium scientiarumque distribuit usus.” Cf. passage quoted 
above (DID, 9), and also 209: “Primum constat artes omneis paulatim et per incrementa reper-
tas esse, neque quisquam idem artem aliquam coepit et absolvit. Prima autem initia a sensuum 
observatione profecta sunt, ut cum viderent homines aliquid iterum tertiove et saepius itidem 
ﬁeri, experimento sumpto, ausi sunt tandem aﬃrmare, prorsus sic se rem in omnibus habere,” 
followed by examples from observations of nature. Cf. also 63: “Intellectu vero comprehendun-
tur, quaecumque ex istis [the phenomena] animus, agitatione mentis, colligit atque decrepit.” 
Note the use of excerpere or, in this case, decerpere.
57) DID, 161: “Diﬀerunt autem omnia aut solum ut singula: ut singuli inter se homines, singuli 
equi et quaecunque individua sub una continentur specie. Aut specie: ut quaecunque individua 
sub diversis sunt speciebus, vel ipsae inter se species diversae: ut hic homo et hic equus, et homo 
et equus.”
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ity of the expression “one in number,” which can refer to substance (e.g. homo 
and animal rationale having the same substance) or to “denominatio” (as in 
“Cicero is eloquent,” even though Cicero and eloquence are not the same in 
substance) (162). There is no mention here nor anywhere else of the Scotist 
notion of individual diﬀerence, and we look in vain for the term “(in)com-
municabilitas” that played an important role in the earlier treatises.58
6. Conclusion
It is risky to compare such a long and rich work as the De inventione dialectica 
with a brief treatise on a limited topic that does not even begin to address the 
many issues that form the contents of the De inventione dialectica. Yet it is 
clear that Agricola’s view of the topics owes something to his earlier reﬂection 
on universals. We have seen him defending a position in the treatise on uni-
versals that tries to combine his belief in common essences and qualities that 
structure reality with his conviction that everything that is is one, including 
common natures that are singular in unity though not singular in “incom-
municability.” Universals exist outside the soul, but it is our mind that must 
notice the similitudes between diﬀerent things and bring them together under 
species and genera, and, more generally, under general patterns that constitute 
the content of the sciences. We have also suggested that this moderate realism 
is not too dissimilar from Scotus’s position that modern scholars have described 
as a conceptualism of universals coupled with a realism of community, though 
Agricola’s debt might have been fairly general. His treatment of the topics in 
the De inventione dialectica may be said to follow on his treatment of univer-
sals: topics too describe real aspects of things, but they function at a higher 
level, being labels of general features that things have in common. Topics are 
said to have been invented by wise men, yet their invention is not a mere 
stroke of brilliant intuition but is based on observation of a mind-independent 
structure of reality. The function of topics in Agricola’s system is of course 
argumentative and rhetorical, but their roots are metaphysical, as Agricola 
himself explicitly acknowledged. 
58) Agricola often speaks of the “nature and property (proprietas) of a thing” (e.g. 72, 109, 175, 
209, 363), which is arguably the equivalent of the common nature and the diﬀerentia individu-
alis of the earlier treatise. His use of the term “proprium” follows the Porphyrian account (49-50), 
and hence it is a diﬀerent concept.
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As such, the little treatise—and Agricola’s response to Phaselus—may thus 
be seen as an early step in Agricola’s long-term project to revise and re-orga-
nize the systems of topics as he encountered them in Aristotle, Cicero and 
Boethius. Certainly, these sources are his main sources of inspiration, but the 
debate on universals, embedded in the discussions on universals in the univer-
sities that he attended, might have helped him in recognizing the metaphysi-
cal foundation of the topics, something that the classical sources would also 
have suggested to him. It may well go too far to say that the universals were 
transformed into the topics. Rather, the universals became part of the topics—
as they had already been in the systems of the topics of his predecessors—just 
as other general features of things were upgraded to become a common label 
to be used by the speaker searching for material to construct convincing 
arguments.
Unlike humanists such as Valla, Ramus and Nizolio, Agricola was thus not 
against metaphysics nor was he an anti-Aristotelian as they professed to be 
(though he frequently criticized the style of Aristotle and his scholastic succes-
sors). He did not feel the need to attack the foundations of the Aristotelian-
scholastic ediﬁce, convinced as he was that things had essences in common. 
He moved in circles where Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and Duns Sco-
tus were venerated as patrons of the late-medieval schools and Bursae, and, as 
pointed out, he himself praised Duns Scotus a few times. But in spite of his 
recognition of the importance of metaphysics, there is a tendency in his think-
ing that moves away from a focus on universals as such and away from the 
process of abstraction by which universals as essences are to be dug up. As we 
have seen, the traditional universals become a subclass of a much wider group 
of common headings to be used ﬂexibly for inventing arguments in the widely 
expanded art of dialectic. These headings direct our view to what things have 
in common and in what they disagree, and at several places in the De inven-
tione dialectica and also in his famous letter to Jacques Barbireau containing 
an extensive plan of study for the addressee, we see Agricola championing 
empirical observation of all aspects of things, which enables us to bring the 
phenomena under groups, general laws, general rules and precepts, which 
make up the arts and sciences.59 From here it is a small step to identifying the 
59) DID 62-65; 70-71; 75-76, 209; letter no. 38, ed. and transl. Van der Laan and Akkerman, 
207: “I would recommend you attack the things themselves (res ipsas). You have gotten to the 
stage of needing to examine the geography and nature of lands, seas, mountains and rivers; the 
customs, borders and circumstances of nations that live on earth; the empires in their historical 
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universals—used in a suitably broad and ﬂexible way, as we have seen Agricola 
employing the term—with the kinds or groups in which we categorize things: 
the universal cathood becomes the class of individual cats out there: the focus 
is on the group of things that show particular similarities (and dissimilarities) 
rather than on the entity—mysteriously one and many at the same time—that 
lies hidden in the individual things and that somehow needs to be disclosed 
by analysis and abstraction. It is a step that Nizolio, who often refers to Agri-
cola, explicitly takes in his critique of universals (1553), identifying universals 
with groups of individuals that the human mind grasps as one.60 The prag-
matic turn that Agricola makes in the ﬁeld of dialectic is thus accompanied by 
an understanding of universals that has become less overtly metaphysical. 
Agricola’s achievements were of course in the ﬁeld of dialectic, but his prag-
matic and empirical approach, championing detailed observation and a care-
ful description of the phenomena, might be interpreted as an indication of a 
gradual change in the intellectual climate that ultimately led to new forms of 
learning and new approaches in studying the natural world.61
or extended forms; you have now got to look into the medicinal properties of trees and herbs . . .” 
(with two minimal changes to their translation). See n. 56 above.
60) See Nauta, ‘Anti-Essentialism and the Rhetoricization of Knowledge’.
61) I am grateful to Henk Braakhuis and in particular to Peter Mack for their suggestions and 
comments. Nikki Hausen was so kind to check my English.
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Appendix: An Edition of Agricola’s Reply to a Critic of his Treatise on 
Universals (Stuttgart, Württembergische Landesbibliothek, Cod. poet. et 
phil. 4o 36)
As explained in the article, Agricola’s treatise on universals, which Alardus of 
Amsterdam incorporated in his sixteenth-century edition of the De inventione 
dialectica (Cologne, 1539), was criticized in a brief text by a certain Phaselus, 
whom Agricola seems to have known personally (see the text below lines 46 
and 80). Nothing is known about this Phaselus. Agricola responded to him 
with the little text transcribed and lightly edited below, entitled in the MS 
“Rhodolph Agricola Phaselo philosopho de universali singulari et uno.” Phase-
lus’s own text is written in a style that is hardly comprehensible, so I decided 
not to give my transcript here, although the handwriting is clear. Phaselus’s 
text and Agricola’s response (but not Agricola’s original treatise) are found in 
the famous collection of Agricola’s texts in the Stuttgart manuscript (Stutt-
gart, Württembergische Landesbibliothek, Cod. poet. et phil. 4o 36): 
–  203r-204v (new pagination): Sententia Phaseli philosophi de universali sin-
gulari et uno ad Rhodolphum scripta
–  205r-209r (new pagination): Rhodolph Agricola Phaselo philosopho de uni-
versali singulari et uno. 
The entire manuscript was compiled at the initiative of Agricola’s friends and 
admirers, the brothers Dietrich and Johannes von Plieningen, who asked their 
copist Johannes Pfeutzer to transcribe the De inventione dialectica and other 
texts, probably in the early 1490s. We do not know which exemplars he used. 
An extensive description of the entire manuscript is provided in the catalogue 
of the Stuttgart MSS.1
Rhodolph Agricola Phaselo philosopho de universali singulari et uno2
Quum lego ea que doctissime uir mihi respondisti non modo modernorum 
(ut hoc uerbo utar) acumen quod sibi precipue uenditare uolunt requiro sed 
tuum iudicium miror, quod haud cunctanter omnibus huius recentioris 
1) W. Irtenkauf and I. Krekler, Codices poetici et philologici (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1981), 
102-104 with reference to older literature on p. 102. [http://www.manuscripta-mediaevalia.de/
hs/katalogseiten/HSK0076_b102_jpg.htm]. See also L. Mundt’s edition of the DID (Tübingen, 
1992), 659-62.
2) Rh<od>o<lph> Agri<cola> phaselo ph<ilosoph>o de universali singulari et uno ms. Old pagi-
nation 191r-195r; new pagination 205r-209r.
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philosophie pretulero. Quum enim tam diligenter distinxissem quid unum, 
quid singulare, quottuplex rerum distinctio esset, quid item uniuersalitas esset, 
quid communicabilitas in rebus, tu tamen tanquam oblitus aduersarii uisus es 
mihi non tam de his que ego dixi quam que dici solent a uulgaribus et, ut ait 
Cicero, quintae classis philosophis maluisse disserere.3 Vt tamen conferamus 
pedem et intra prescriptum et uelut praeﬁnitos terminos agamus, ante omnia 
statuendum uidetur quid sit communicabilitas in rebus; ex ea4 enim oritur 
universale. Nihil enim aliud uidetur esse uniuersale quam unum communica-
bile multis. Commune ergo dicitur uel possessione uel eﬃciendi ratione. Sic 
res que publice sunt communes dicuntur omnium ciuium, et ﬁlii communes 
parentum sicut apud Virgilium dictum est: “et nati serues communis 
amorem.”5 Quandoque commune dicitur quod multis inest, sic pestilentiam 
commune malum dicimus et dicimur communicare eruditionem nostram 
cum his quos docemus. Priori autem modo potest unum numero manens 
commune esse, nam possunt unius rei multi esse domini, et pater atque mater 
communiter unum gignunt. Quod autem in existendo commune dicitur, id 
impossibile est unum numero manens communicari cum multis; neque enim 
possibile est ut unum manens insit multis. Dicimus /205v / itaque pestilen-
tiam commune malum esse, non quod multi eadem pestilentia numero 
laborent, suo enim quisque egrotat morbo, sed quod sit similis generis pesti-
lentia in multis. Sic et doctrina communicatur, non quod quisquam eam 
ipsam quam habet alii tradat, sed quod docendo similis rationis in alio erudi-
tionem quis parat. At faciem suam nemo alteri communicare dicitur, quo-
niam non est in manu cuiquam ut eius similitudinem alteri tradat. Quum sit 
ergo uniuersale commune multis in existendo uel inherendo—quod enim de 
multis dicitur necesse est insit et multis—erit uniuersale commune hac poste-
riori ratione communitatis, ut sit nihil aliud uniuersale quam unum cuius 
similitudo reperiatur6 in multis. Unum autem dico non numero quemadmo-
dum unaqueque res una dicitur sic ut non sit multa sed unum, quemadmo-
dum in duobus albis dicimus unum esse colorem7 hoc <est> unitate 
indiﬀerentie uel similitudine rationis uel (ut propriissime uno uerbo eloquar) 
conformitate. Conformes enim res esse idipsum est quod dicimus uel conue-
nire specie uel unam speciem habere, καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἶδος, quod nos speciem 
3) Acad. post. 2.73.
4) eo ms.
5) Aen. 2.789 (serua).
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uocamus,8 Cicero maluit formam interpretari.9 Itaque que specie conuenire 
dicimus, non absurde conformia diceremus. Quemadmodum ergo similitudi-
nem in multis unam qualitatem dicimus non numero unam sed ratione aut 
conformitate, et equalitatem in multis unam quantitatem simili unius inter-
pretatione, sic uniuersalitatem aut identatem genericam aut speciﬁcam dici-
mus in multis unam essentiam, unum genus, unam speciem, ad hanc /206r/ 
eandem unius rationem quam prediximus. Non esse autem istud meum 
τέχνασμα nec hec dicere me, quo urgentes nouioris philosophie argumenta-
tiones lubrico (ut soles iocari) ﬂexu elabar. Sed sic omnes ueteres et sensisse et 
locutos esse, paratius est deprehendere quam ut docendum putem. Nec enim 
Porphyrius dixit pure plures homines esse unum hominem sed unum homi-
nem specie. Quod si sensisset in multis hominibus communem quandam 
humanitatem numero unam esse, quominus poterant unum numero uocari 
ab uno numero inexistente eis quam ab albedine alba, a quantitate magna 
uocantur? Sic Aristoteles quum dixit uniuoca esse quorum nomen est unum 
et secundum id nomen ratio est eadem, ut bos equus homo idem nomen 
habent animalis, et eandem proinde rationem. Quod si interrogasses Aristote-
lem “essetne ratio animalis specie eadem in homine equo et boue?” dixisset: 
“nequaquam, sed genere tantum.” Ergo aliud animal specie bos est aliud equus 
aliud homo. Iam quum in philosophia in primis confessum sit impossibile 
esse que specie diﬀerunt numero eadem esse, certum est idem numero com-
mune animal noluisse Aristotelem dicere esse in homine equo boue, quum 
specie esset in eis animal diuersum. Sane esse naturam animalis in omnibus 
animalibus hac ratione communem qua a me explicatum est neque ipse negas 
neque quisquam, arbitror, cui ulla ratio est aut notitia rerum, inﬁcias ibit. Sed 
hanc animalis naturam ab equi natura in equo et equi naturam a Rhebi 
<natura>10 in Rhebo distingui, id prorsus uidetur, in quo nobis non conuenit, 
hoc est: ego aliud esse a quo Rhebus animal a quo equus a quo Rhebus uocetur 
dico, id tu negas; hoc est in quo constitimus /206v/ hec summa certaminis 
nostri est. Dicamus ergo ad ea que obiicis dicemusque his ipsis <uerbis> qui-
bus usus es ne quam fraudem aut captionem struere uideamur. “Si homo 
homini essentialiter similis est,” inquis, “inter essentialiter similia cadit rela-
tiua oppositio quia similitudo. Similitudo unius tantum aut in uno tantum 
esse non potest nisi duo sint alba dueque albedines albedine similia non sunt. 
Hac igitur uniuersalis deﬁnitione ad hoc ut humanitas actu uniuersalis sit de 
 8) Aristotle, Cat. 2b18.
 9) Acad. post. 1.8.
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minori due erunt humanitates, etiam si posteriorum nihil sit siue indiuidualis 
diﬀerentia uocetur siue suppositum.”11 Hec tu quasi uero. Ego istud usquam 
uel negauerim uel negem et non aperte plus semel dixerim etiam duas huma-
nitates in Socrate et Platone numero diuersas esse sic ut uerum sit dicere hanc 
non esse illam. Et ego ipse etiam dixi utranque singularem singularitate numeri 
sic ut utraque una sit et non plures, sed non tamen iccirco singulares esse 
singu laritate incommunicabilitatis quo modo12 singularis (ut mihi uidetur) 
satis exacte prosecutus in eo tractatu sum13 quem nuper ad te dedi.14 Proseque-
ris ergo: “Signentur ille due humanitates suis notis et uocetur una quidem a 
reliqua b, et sit illa signatura in essentiali illa precisione et limitatione quo non 
ﬂuctuet locutio, ‘a est’, ‘b est’.”15 Hoc possumus tibi nullo damno nostro dare. 
Addis deinde: “a est essentialiter simile ipsi b.”16 Hoc primum non dabo tibi, 
non enim humanitas est similis humanitati, quemadmodum albedines similes 
non sunt sed ea sunt quibus duo alba simulant; et anima animata non est sed 
est ea qua homo ani- /207r/ matus est. Sic humanitates due similes aut confor-
mes non sunt sed sunt quibus duo homines similes sunt uel conformantur. Vt 
tamen demus istud orationis gratia similes esse duas humanitates, erunt haud 
dubie seipsis similes, sed hic est modus loquendi magis ad nostre mentis uim 
quam ad ueritatem rei consistens. Sed demus, inquam, istud quid infers: “ergo 
a non est b, quia si a esset b, nequaquam a esset simile b.”17 Fateor sane hoc 
ipsum. Addis sed “similia omnia ad aliquid sunt quorum hoc ipsum [est]18 
quod sunt aliorum est,19 per se igitur diuersa sunt a et b, per se prorsus diuersa,” 
haud sane uideo quo pacto hanc conclusionem ex hac propositione inferas. 
Neque enim uerba satis aperte id eﬃciunt. Videor tamen coniectura me colli-
gere posse animum tuum. Sumis enim duas humanitates esse similes, deinde 
11) This and the following quotations cited by Agricola from Phaselus’ sententia can be found at 
f. 203r, henceforth referred to as “Phaselus;” Phaselus has “distinctione” rather than “deﬁnitione.”
12) modos ms.
13) sum added in superscr.
14) A reference to Agricola’s Questio de uniuersalibus, a text that Alardus added in his 1539 ed. 
of the DID (see the article). Phaselus writes: “Primum gratias habeo quod huius mee sententie 
tantam contra reales omnes et formales habeam propugnationem” (203r). Alardus does not 
mention Phaselus in his introduction to the Questio. The order of composition was therefore: 
Agricola’s Questio, Phaselus’s sententia, and this response by Agricola.
15) Phaselus, f. 203r.
16) Phaselus, f. 203r.
17) Phaselus, f. 203r.
18) est ms.
19) sunt Phaselus, f. 203r. Aristotle, Cat. 6a36, transl. Boethius: “Ad aliquid uero talia dicuntur 
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omnia similia esse ad aliquid. Deinde est deﬁnitio ad aliquid: quecunque ad 
aliquid sunt eorum hoc ipsum esse aliorum est; sed humanitates due sunt ad 
aliquid. Ergo earum hoc ipsum esse quod sunt aliorum est. Rursus due huma-
nitates hoc ipso esse quod aliorum sunt, ergo hoc ipso esse diuerse sunt, ergo 
et per se diuerse sunt. Aut hoc est quod uis eﬃcere aut licet ingenue fateri mihi 
non intelligere me quid dicas. Dicam primum ad ordinem colligendi, deinde 
de re ipsa. Primum ergo quod dicis “omnia similia esse ad aliquid,” quia hec 
uox ‘ad aliquid’ non habet declinationem, non est facile perspicere sitne 
concretum an abstractum. Fingamus ergo, aut rectius dicam sumamus nomina 
non inusitata his rebus, dicamusque concretum του πρόσ τι relatum, abstrac-
tum uero relationem. Quan- /207v/ do ergo dicis “omnia similia sunt ad ali-
quid,” i.e. sunt relata, nihil repugno. Quum addis “ad aliquid sunt quorum 
hoc ipsum quod sunt aliorum est,” certum est hic non deﬁniri ad aliquid in 
concreto sed in abstracto. Duo enim homines ad aliquid, i.e. relati sunt, qui 
sunt pater et ﬁlius, non tamen hoc ipsum esse quod sunt aliorum est, cuique 
enim suum est esse per se et independens, et quod non sit alterius. Sin dicas 
autem duas humanitates quatenus similes sunt ad aliquid esse et eatenus hoc 
ipsum esse quod sunt aliorum esse, non negabo quatenus similes sunt, idest 
similitudines ipsas per se diuersas esse sed non quatenus humanitates sunt, 
neque enim arbitror dicere te ab eodem habere eas quod absolute humanitates 
et quod relatiue similes dicantur. Vides ergo quorsum tibi hec argumentatio 
redeat. Hec de ordine colligendi argumentationis tue; reliquum de re ipsa 
agam liberalius tecum quam credis, uincamque spem tuam, dabo per se diuer-
sas esse has duas humanitates a et b per se, inquam, diuersas. Ecquid gratias 
agis? Ecquid hanc confessionem amplecteris? An dicis forte: “Quicquid id est, 
timeo Danaos hec dona ferentes.”20 Recte ne an secus, istuddem alterius forte 
campi sudor esset uerum in presentia quando id cedere hosti forte saluis pre-
sidiis mihi uideor posse non ero magnopere in hoc sollicitus.21 Infers ergo: 
“Per seipsa realiter indiuidua sunt a et b, quia signata diuersa.” Non nego esse 
per se indiuidua si capiamus indiuiduum pro omni eo quod unum numero 
est. “Nullo ergo,” inquis, “extrinseco22 indigent indiuiduante deorsum23 nullo 
superius uniuocante aut uniente.” Duo colligis, quorum /208r/ alterum ex 
propositis sequi uidetur, alterum ex priori uelut pari infertur. De utroque 
dicendum est igitur, quoniam ex equo ad institutum nostrum pertinet utrun-
20) Aen. 2.49.
21) The sentence Recte ne . . . sollicitus might be corrupt.
22) extrinsico ms.; extrinseco Phaselus, f. 203r.
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que. Quod dicis ergo non indigere a et b ulla extrinsecus indiuiduante deor-
sum, quoniam addis id24 uerbum “deorsum,” haud dubie de eo indiuiduo 
loqui uideris quod incommunicabile est, idest cuius propria ratio in nullo alio 
similis reperitur, quoniam sursum et deorsum solum latitudine conformitatis 
et angustia diﬀormitatis in rebus in proposito nostro constant. Neque enim 
aliquid dicitur com<m>une multis quia sit unum numero in multis sed quia 
multa sunt conformabilia in eo, uel quia id est in multis non unum numero 
sed tantum conforme, hoc est unum assimulatione, sic contra quod indiui-
duum est uel singulare non dicitur quia ab alio diuersum est, i.e. quia hoc non 
est illud aut quia unum numero est—quecunque enim sunt, sunt unum 
numero quodque—sed quum sit oppositum uniuersali uel communi, que ex 
conformabilitate naturam suam sortiuntur. Dicitur econtrario singulare uel 
indiuiduum quod quantum ad precisam rationem suam nulli conforme est, 
hoc est quod diﬀerre diximus in priori tractatu uocari, quum inter diﬀerentia 
diuersa discreta diceremus quid interesset. Sic equus et homo quatenus est in 
utroque animalitas conformia sunt, sunt enim eatenus similia, quia utrunque 
horum conformem uel similem habet animalitatem, quanquam sit utraque 
animalitas in hoc homine et hoc equo per se diuersa altera ab altera, hoc est 
numero /208v/ non solum sed et specie distincta: uerum numero per se distin-
guuntur quia hec non est illa,25 specie uero distinguuntur per aliud aliquid 
accedens ad ea. Homo enim et equus quatenus utrunque animal est, hoc est in 
animalitate, rogo ergo: sintne diﬀormes homo et equus quatenus utrunque 
animal est, hoc est in animalitate, non uidetur ut possint duo esse in eodem 
precisa26 diﬀormia et conformia. Sunt autem diﬀormia homo et equus quo-
niam specie diﬀerunt, non autem animalitate ut dictum est. Ergo equinitate 
equus homini diﬀormis est et humanitate homo diﬀormis est equo. Quum sit 
autem datum hominem equumque hac quidem conformes esse diﬀormes et 
inpossibile sit in eodem precise aliqua conformia et diﬀormia esse, quunque 
sint conformes homo et equus animalitate, diﬀormes equinitate ex parte equi, 
humanitate ex parte hominis, impossibile est idem precise esse animalitatem 
et equinitatem in equo et animalitatem et humanitatem in homine. Vides 
ergo ut non consequatur “sunt per se diuersa, ergo nullo indigent extrinseco27 
indiuiduante deorsum,” si de indiuiduitate (sic) uera que opposita est commu-
nicabilitati loquimur. Quemadmodum enim si dari possent animalitas equi et 
24) id add. in superscr. ms.
25) ab illa ms.









224 L. Nauta / Vivarium 50 (2012) 190-224
hominis utraque per se subsistens, non adiuncta equinitate aut humanitate aut 
illa posteriore diﬀerentia, uerum esset dicere eas esse diuersas, hoc est hanc 
non esse illam, et esse hec duo animalia, sed ut singulares ﬁerent he animalita-
tes idest diﬀormes uel diﬀerentes, necesse esset accedere diﬀerentias speciﬁcas 
que singulares eas facerent; /209r/ est enim species generi comparata singulare 
quoddam. Ergo non erunt dissimiles he animalitates nisi accedat hinc huma-
nitas illinc equinitas; neque dicentur diﬀerre inter se quanquam diuerse sint. 
Sic itidem in duabus humanitatibus ﬁt ut utraque sit altera ab altera diuersa, 
uerum Socrates a Platone non solum diﬀert quia Socrates non Plato sed etiam 
accedit proprietas quedam qua Socrates quatenus Socrates est diﬀormis est 
Platoni quatenus Plato est. Et hec est diﬀerentia illa quam indiuidualem dici-
mus uocari. Non ergo quanquam diuerse sint singulares dicentur he humani-
tates nisi accesserit eis diﬀerentia qua adiuncta tale quiddam constituant quod 
sit incommunicabile, idest cui conforme in nullo alio possit inueniri.
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